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evolution of the pollution stock is examined. Replicator dynamics modeling 
participation and compliance are combined with pollution stock dynamics. Fast-slow 
selection dynamics are used to capture the fact that decisions to participate in and 
further comply with the public VA evolve in different time scales. Evolutionary stable 
(ES) equilibria depend on the structure of the legislation and auditing probability. 
Partial participation and partial compliance can be ES equilibria, with possible 
multiplicities, in addition to the monomorphic equilibria of full (non) compliance. 
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and compliance can be attained if the regulator is pre-committed to certain legislation 
and inspection probabilities, or by appropriate choices of the legislatively set emission 
level and the non-compliance fine. 
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Recent experience in environmental regulation indicates that traditional regula-
tory instruments, such as emission taxes, subsidies, or tradeable permit systems
etc., might not be entirely successful in reversing the environmental degrada-
tion process, creating the need for an evolution of environmental policy towards
new instruments. Voluntary approaches appear to be an alternative to tradi-
tional instruments to pollution control, since they oﬀer certain advantages over
mandatory regulations that impose technology restrictions or penalties on ﬁrms.
They are expected to increase economic and environmental eﬀectiveness, as well
as social welfare, since they allow ﬁrms greater ﬂexibility in their pollution con-
trol strategies and also have the potential to reduce transaction and compliance
costs.1 Voluntary approaches can be placed into three basic categories, based
mainly on the degree of public intervention.2 Negotiated agreements,w h i c ha r e
the most common cases of voluntary approaches, imply a bargaining process be-
tween the regulatory body and a ﬁrm or an industry group, in order to jointly
set the environmental goal and the means of achieving it. Unilateral agreements
are environmental improvement programs prepared and voluntarily adopted by
ﬁrms themselves.3 Public voluntary agreements are environmental programs
developed by a regulatory body with which ﬁrms can only agree with and in
return they may receive technical aid, supplementary funds and/or favorable
publicity4.
The potentially most serious drawback of voluntary approaches (VAs) is
that they leave room for "free-riding" behavior. Particularly, in an industry-
wide public voluntary agreement where the attainment of an environmental
target requires collective action, individual ﬁrms may have incentives not to
reduce their emissions but to rely upon other ﬁrms to carry out the actions
necessary to attain the target. These ﬁrms can decide not to participate in
the achievement of the established goal either ex-ante (non-participation), or
ex-post after signing the agreement (non-compliance). Therefore, it is possible
that the incentive to free-ride may impede the establishment of a public VA, or
may result in a failure of the agreement because signatory ﬁrms do not comply
with the rules of the VA.5 This suggests some limitations in the ability of VAs
to attain desired targets. In fact there are some reservations regarding the abil-
ity of public VAs to improve environmental quality as an independent policy
tool, based on empirical observations . A c c o r d i n gt oar e p o r tb yE n v i r o n m e n t
1The theoretical analysis of voluntary approaches to environemtal regulation has been
mainly developed in the recent decade. See for example the work of Carraro and Siniscalco
(1996), Segerson and Miceli (1998), Segerson and Dawson (2000), Brau et al. (2001), Lyon
and Maxwell (2003).
2This refers primarily to the degree the of authority’s impact on a certain hierarchical level
of public administration (Šauer et al., 2001).
3Such voluntary approaches are also known as "self-regulation".
4Polluting ﬁrms may receive rights to use an ecological logo or certiﬁcation label.
5Nevertheless, despite the presence of apparent incentives to free-ride it is possible to have
an equilibrium in which the environmental target is achieved and only a subset of ﬁrms in the
industry comply with the agreement’s provisions, while the remaining free-ride (Dawson and
Segerson, 2001).
3Canada, "the industrial sectors that relied solely on self monitoring or voluntary
compliance6 had a compliance rating of 60% versus the 94% average compliance
rating of those industries which were subject to federal regulations combined with
a consistent inspection program".7 These ﬁndings imply that both participation
in and compliance with the agreement’s provisions and goals are important in
successful VAs. Indeed without appropriate threats of sanctions or enforcement
schemes, there may be a problem of compliance or uneven application. Thus
it seems that a successful VA scheme may need to include a mix of voluntary
and mandatory features, to ensure that polluting agents will not only sign the
public VA but also comply with its provisions and reduce their emissions to a
desirable level. Examples of successful public voluntary programs include the
EPA’s "33-50" program that seeks to encourage ﬁrms in the US Chemical in-
dustry to voluntarily reduce the discharges of 17 high-priority toxic chemicals
under the background threat of legislation (Khanna and Damon, 1998), the
environmental management system certiﬁcation standards "EMAS" and "ISO
14000" (Šauer et al., 2001), the "US. Conservation Reserve Program" (CRP)
that used cost-sharing and other ﬁnancial inducements to achieve reduction of
agricultural pollution through voluntarily participation in soil conservation and
other erosion control programs (Segerson and Miceli, 1998) and its successor
"Environmental Quality Incentives Program" (EQIP) (Dawson and Segerson,
2001). Examples of public VA schemes8 include the "Canadian Industry Pro-
gram for Energy Conservation" (CIPEC), the "US Green Lights" , the "Motor
Challenge" programs for industry, as well as the "Golden Carrot" program for
manufactures of highly energy-eﬃcient refrigerators which have been recently
consolidated with the "Motor Challenge" (OECD 1998). The Canadian "Cli-
mate Change Voluntary Challenge and Registry Program" permits least-cost
actions from industry, business, government and public institutions to limit or
reduce net greenhouse gas emissions, and participants are free from government
regulatory requirements.
In the present paper we study the long-run structure of a public VA where
the regulator makes an oﬀer to a large number of homogeneous ﬁrms to reduce
emissions in order to voluntarily attain, by using ﬂexible cost saving methods,
a desired target ambient pollution level.9 The type of VA programme we study
has many similarities with voluntary climate change programs or the various
Energy Star programs.10 If the oﬀer attains full participation, a target ambient
pollution stock is attained. If there is no full participation there is a deviation
from the target and a positive probability of legislation that will regulate the
6The term compliance refers to the state of conformity with the existing environmental
provisions.
7"Enforcement vs Voluntary Compliance: An Examination of the Strategic Enforcement
Initiatives Implemented by the Paciﬁca n dY u k o nR e g i o n a lO ﬃce of Environment Canada,
Report No. DOEFRAP 19983.
8It should be noted that while "ProjectXL" and "Common Sense Initiative" involve nego-
tiation, they also resemble public voluntary programs.
9The ﬂexible methods of reducing emissions through the VA program have a weak cost
advantage relative to regulation like, for example, the XL Project or the EPA’s 33-50.
10See, for example, OECD (1998).
4sector through conventional instruments such as taxes or emission limits. Thus
free riding, in the sense of not participating and expecting to avoid regulation
because others are participating, may trigger regulation. Participating ﬁrms
are not directly observed by the regulator so there could be incentives not to
comply. The regulator tries to deter non-compliance by random auditing and
ﬁnes to those found not in compliance with the VA programme. The probability
of auditing may increase with deviations from the target ambient pollution level.
In modelling the process where ﬁrms decide whether to participate in the
agreement under a probabilistic regulation threat, we adopt an evolutionary
framework. The basic characteristic of this framework is that, although ﬁrms
are proﬁt maximizers in the output choice, when it comes to choosing a strat-
egy regarding participating in the VA programme, or whether to comply or not,
they adopt a more passive decision making and not an explicit optimizing behav-
ior.11 This more passive decision making is modelled by an evolutionary process
where decisions are taken by comparing the proﬁts of a strategy to participate
and comply with the corresponding expected proﬁts of a nonparticipating, non-
complying ﬁrm. Successful strategies, in the sense of those attaining higher
expected proﬁts, are imitated by other ﬁrms with a probability proportional to
the diﬀerence between the corresponding proﬁts. Thus proﬁtd i ﬀerentials exer-
cise evolutionary pressures on the composition of the population so that more
successful strategies increase their share in the total population of ﬁrms. A sim-
ple way to model the movements in the composition of the population of ﬁrms
regarding participation in and compliance with the VA is the use of replicator
dynamics.12 We use replicator dynamics as our selection dynamics to model in
two stages the evolution of: (i) the decision to sign or not the agreement, and
(ii) the decision to comply or not with the agreement’s provisions after signing
it. The use of replicator dynamics allows us to determine strategies regarding
participation and compliance which are evolutionary stable (ES).13 We further
elaborate on the selection dynamics by considering the situation where decisions
to participate or not evolve fast, since when the oﬀer is made there is usually a
time framework determined by legal considerations,14 while decisions regarding
compliance after participation are unconstrained and we expect them to evolve
much more slowly. This suggests that the ES equilibrium composition of ﬁrms
regarding participation in the VA is reached faster than the ES equilibrium com-
position regarding compliance, which suggests that selection dynamics operate
in a fast-slow dynamics framework.
11This evolutionary approach might be interpreted as ecompassing ideas of bounded ratio-
nality since it can be associated with ﬁrms’ bounded ability to fully perceive either advantages
associated with ﬂexibilities and cost superiority of the VA programme, or costs associated with
probabilistic ﬁnes. For general presentations of these approaches see for example Nelson (1995)
and Conlisk (1996).
12For deﬁnitions, see, for example, Weibull (1995). For applications of this methodology to
common property resources see, Sethi and Somanathan (1998).
13A strategy is evolutionary stable if it can not be invaded by a mutant strategy. (See for
example Weibull (1995) page 36)
14For example EPA’s National Environmental Performance Track accepts applications twice
ay e a r .
5Our contribution lies therefore in using, for the ﬁrst time to our knowledge,
an evolutionary approach with fast-slow selection dynamics to jointly determine
the steady-state equilibrium fraction of signatory and complying ﬁrms, as well
as the corresponding steady-state equilibrium emission stock. Using this ap-
proach we are able to determine "which strategies survive in the long-run",i n
the sense of evolutionary stability, deﬁne the structure that a voluntary agree-
ment would have in the long run and identify policy rules that might produce
desirable ES VAs.15 The analysis indicates that the value and characteristics of
the legislation probability and the auditing probability are of crucial importance
for the resulting long-term equilibrium outcome. Under diﬀerent assumptions
about the legislation probability, the fast time dynamic system can alternatively
converge to a polymorphic or monomorphic steady state, implying either partial
or full (non) participation in the public VA. Similarly by choosing the structure
of the auditing probability, the regulator can achieve partial or full (non) com-
pliance. There is a possibility of unique or multiple ES equilibria with potential
irreversibilities, while the convergence to these equilibria could be monotonic
or oscillating. Full participation and full compliance, which can be regarded as
the desired outcome for the regulator, can be attained if the regulator is pre-
committed to certain legislation and inspection probabilities, or by appropriate
choices of the legislatively set emission level and the non-compliance ﬁne.
2 The Industrial Model
Assume an industrial sector consisting of i =1 ,2,...n small and identical ﬁrms.
Firms operate under competitive conditions and emit into the ambient environ-
ment. Emissions accumulate in the environment and cause external damages.
Due to the externality emissions exceed the socially-desirable levels without reg-
ulation. The regulator proposes formally a "take-it-or-leave-it" environmental
protection scheme and gives each ﬁrm in the industrial sector a chance to volun-
tarily meet an exogenously determined emission level ev. This type of public VA
oﬀers full ﬂexibility to choose the proﬁt-maximizing and legislative preemptive
means of achieving the target and could provide cost advantages over legislative
regulation (Brau et al., 2001, Segerson 2001).
In particular the regulator proposes a long-term "preemptive" public volun-
tary environmental contract16 to which ﬁrms can only agree or not. If all ﬁrms
follow the agreement then total emissions in the ambient environment will be
Ev = nev, assuming that the pollution stock S accumulates according to:




15For a similar approach regrading the regulation of a renewable resource, see Xepapadeas
(2003)
16Such voluntary approaches indirectly reduce expected production costs because they re-
duce the probability of facing a (more costly) direct regulatory regime (Brau et al., 2001).
6where E (t) denotes total emissions at time t due to industrial activities, and
the term ϕ(S (t)) denotes emissions outﬂows reﬂecting natural environmental
self cleaning process and environmental feedbacks.
Let, ¯ S(t) be the path of the pollution stock under full participation and
compliance to the agreement. If there is no full participation, a deviation is
expected between the observed stock of pollution and the desired stock ¯ S(t).
We denote this deviation at time t by ∆S (t)=S(t) − ¯ S(t). Participation in
the agreement does not imply that a ﬁrm will also comply with the agreement.
Thus we assume that although the regulator has full observability of the partic-
ipating ﬁrms, simultaneous control of all signatory ﬁrms is prohibitively costly.
In this case inspection of randomly chosen signatory ﬁr m si st h em e c h a n i s m
usually applied to verify compliance and identify compliance problems. There-
fore a positive ∆S (t) might be the result of either partial participation and
non-compliance by some of the participating ﬁrms, or under full participation,
the result of non-compliance by some the ﬁrms that have already signed the
agreement. Let x(t) denote the proportion of participating ﬁrms at time t. It
would be intuitive to assume that from a ﬁrm’s point of view the subjective
probability of having legislation introduced at time t depends on the deviation
∆S(t) and the proportion of participating ﬁrms x(t), or17






< 0 x ∈ [0,1] (2)
where ωv (t) is a vector of other parameters aﬀecting the probability of regula-
tion which may include legislative procedures, transaction costs, etc.
An increase in the deviation ∆S (t) increases the probability of regulation,
while an increase in the number of participating ﬁrms reduces the probability
of regulation. To provide further structure to the probability of introducing
legislation we assume that this probability is common to all ﬁrms and that:
p(0,1) = 0; 18 p(∆S,x|∆S>0,x<1) > 0; p(∆S,1|∆S>0) = 0. That is, if
everybody participates, then the deviation is due to non-compliance and the
regulator has to resort to other methods such as random inspections and ﬁnes
which are discussed below. We assume that (∆S (t),x(t)) are observable by
the regulator and become public information, while there is uncertainty re-
garding the vector ωv. Firms can use announced (∆S (t),x(t)) to calculate
subjective probabilities, but there is uncertainty regarding the probability law
p(∆S (t),x(t),ωv (t)), thus ﬁrms use model (2) as a benchmark for some ﬁxed
value of the vector ωv.
If the ﬁrms believe that the crucial factor that aﬀects the probability of
legislation is not the proportion of participating ﬁrms but only the deviations
from the desired pollution path, then this probability can be further simpliﬁed
17Segerson and Miceli (1998) assume a ﬁxed legislation probability.
18The possibility of p(0,x|x<1) = 0, which allows for overcompliance by some ﬁrms so
that the target is achieved even if some ﬁrms are not participating, is not considered. The
possibility of overcompliance implies the introduction of another strategy, eOC <e v. This
case is left as an area for further research.
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The decision to participate and then to comply or not depends on the struc-
ture of proﬁts. In our model, each ﬁrm produces an output Q and emissions
e. The cost function C(Q,e) is a continuous function where CQ > 0, Ce < 0,
CQQ > 0 and Cee > 0.W ea s s u m et h a tt h eV Ao ﬀers only a cost advantage to
participating and complying ﬁrms since participation and compliance deter the
introduction of relatively more costly mandatory regulation. Moreover partici-
pation in the public VA allows for greater ﬂexibility in the processes of emissions
reduction, and oﬀers lower compliance and transaction costs.20
The ﬁrm’s proﬁt function is deﬁned as Π(e)=m a x Q {PQ− C(Q,e)}. At the
unregulated equilibrium a ﬁrm chooses emissions eo =a r gm a x e Π(e). Therefore
when a ﬁrm decides not to participate in the VA, either ex-ante or ex-post, and
continues producing at the proﬁt-maximizing emission level without facing a
legislative mandate or paying a ﬁne, then proﬁts are deﬁned as ΠN(eo).
If a ﬁrm decides to sign the VA in the ﬁrst stage and voluntarily comply
with its provisions to emit at the agreed level ev then proﬁts are Πv(ev)=
maxQ {PQ− Cv(Q,ev)}, where Cv(Q,e) is the cost function under the ﬂexibil-
ity provided by the VA.
If a ﬁrm decides not to participate in the VA and mandatory legislation is
used to introduce regulation, then its proﬁt function could be deﬁned as:
ΠL(e,τ)=m a x
Q
{PQ− CL(Q,e) − τLe} (4)
ΠL(e)=m a x
Q
{PQ− CL(Q,e)} with e 6 ¯ e (5)
if the legislation introduces an emission tax τ,or an emission limit (performance
standard) ¯ e. In both cases Cv(Q,e) <C L(Q,e) under the cost advantage as-
sumption of the VA. So under legislation proﬁts can be deﬁned as ΠL(eL),w h e r e
eL (τ) = argmaxe ΠL(e,τ) under taxation, or eL =a r gm a x e ΠL(e) subject to
e 6 ¯ e, under a performance standard. Under standard assumptions eL =¯ e.21
If a ﬁrm that has already signed the agreement decides not to comply and
emit at the unregulated level eo, then there is a possibility that the ﬁrm could be
caught after a random inspection. If caught the ﬁrm is subjected to individual
legislation with a performance standard ¯ e = eL and a non-compliance ﬁne F.
Assuming that the individual performance standard is set at eL deﬁned above,
the proﬁts of a non-complying ﬁrm which is caught after a random inspection
19It seems that ∆S shall always be part of the subjective probability in every case. If the
subjective probability is a function of participation proportion x alone, then the incentive to
participate is not linked with the achievement of the environmental target ev.
20We assume that the VA does not improve a ﬁrm’s public image and increase consumers’
goodwill. Therefore total revenues remain unchanged whether ﬁrms participate in the agree-
ment or not and whether they comply with it or not.
21Furthermore, under standard assumptions the target ¯ e = eL c a nb ea c h i e v e de i t h e r
through taxation, if the tax rate is chosen such that eL (τ)=¯ e is a solution to maxe ΠL(e,τ),
or through a performance standard ¯ e.
8is ΠC(eL,F)=ΠL(eL) − F. If the non-complying ﬁrm is not inspected then
proﬁts are simply Πo (eo).
It holds that eo >e L ≥ ev, then our assumptions regarding the structure of
costs and proﬁts imply:
Πo (eo) > Πv(ev) > ΠL(eL) > ΠC(eL,F)
Since, in the case of non-participation in the agreement, the imposition of
legislation is probabilistic, the expected proﬁts of non-participating ﬁrms are :
EΠN = pΠL(eL)+( 1− p)ΠN(eo) ,p = p(∆S,x,ωv) (6)
Therefore a suﬃcient condition for participation in the VA is
Πv(ev) ≥ pΠL(eL)+( 1− p)ΠN(eo) (7)
Let q be the subjective probability that a participating ﬁrm will be inspected
and let z be the proportion of participating ﬁrms that comply with the terms of
the agreement. A ﬁrm’s subjective probability of being audited can be deﬁned
in a general form by q (ω), where ω is a vector of parameters. It is assumed
that this function is common for all ﬁrms and can be further speciﬁed in the
following cases.
In the ﬁrst case the regulator exercises ﬁxed monitoring eﬀort and makes
a ﬁxed number of inspections, say ¯ n per period. In doing so the regulator
announces this policy and thus precommits to a certain auditing probability
which is known by the polluters. In this case the audit probability is ﬁxed, or22
q (ω) ≡ ¯ q (8)
An alternative assumption would be that the regulator exercises variable
monitoring eﬀort, which depends on state variables of the problem that the
regulator can observe.23 One such variable is the deviations from the desired
pollution stock ∆S; another variable is the share of violators u detected during
an audit. The regulator increases the monitoring eﬀort if the stock is declining
or the share of violators is increasing. This policy can be regarded as a type
of no full commitment - or partial commitment - auditing policy on the regula-
tor’s part. The regulator might, for example, not audit individual ﬁrms if the
deviation ∆S is suﬃciently low, but the regulator might start inspecting if the
deviation increases beyond a certain level.24 The ﬁrms are made aware of the
results of the inspections, say through public announcements and/or private
22This is a common assumption in the enforcement literature in environmental economics
(e.g. Malik, 1993; Garvie and Keeler, 1994; Segerson and Miceli, 1998; Stranlund and Dhana,
1999).
23In the enforcement literature, variable monitoring eﬀort is usually related to ﬁrm speciﬁc
variables (e.g. Malik, 1990; VanEgteren and Weber, 1996).
24Grieson and Singh (1990), Khalil (1997), and Franckx (2002) analyze no commitment
frameworks. Franckx relates individual auditing to the level of ambient pollution which is
a global state variable. An environmental regulator chooses which ﬁrm to inspect without
observing ﬁrms’ actions but after observing ambient pollution.
9communications, and perceive that if the deviation increases or the share of
violators increases, more eﬀort will be exercised and thus the subjective proba-
bility of being audited increases. In this case the probability q can be speciﬁed
as stock dependent auditing probability:
q = q (∆S,ωc),q
0
(S,ωc) > 0,q (0,ωc)=0 (9)
where ωc is a vector of parameters similar to ωv.
If the ﬁrms use the observed u as an estimate for their perceived z, that is
they set u = z, a compliance dependent auditing probability is deﬁned as:
q = q(z,ωc),q
0
(z,ωc) < 0,q (1,ωc)=0 ,q(0ωc) > 0 (10)
It is expected that the value of q (0) will be large but not unity since not every
ﬁrm is audited even if nobody complies, while q (1) = 0, since if everybody
is complying the subjective probability of paying the noncompliance ﬁne (and
facing the legislation) is zero.
If (9) and (10) are taken together, a more general formulation for the subjec-
tive auditing probability with joint dependence on compliance and stocks would
be:
q = q (z,∆S,ωc) (11)
In this context the expected proﬁts of a participating but non-complying
ﬁrm are :
EΠN = qΠC(eL,F)+( 1− q)ΠN(eo) (12)
and the suﬃcient condition for complying with the agreement’s provisions
is:
Πv(ev) ≥ qΠC(eL,F)+( 1− q)ΠN(eo) (13)
Given the above framework we explore how imitation and enforcement of be-
havior resulting in higher proﬁts will determine which strategies (participate or
not/comply or not) will survive in the long run. We model the selection dynam-
ics that can be used to determine the ES strategies by replicator dynamics.
3R e p l i c a t o r D y n a m i c s
Assuming that at a given time t the industrial sector consists of two groups
of ﬁrms, each group could follow two possible strategies concerning the oﬀered
public VA, participate or not. Let x(t) denote the proportion of ﬁrms par-
ticipating in the agreement, while xN(t) denotes the remaining proportion of
non-signatory agents at time t, with x(t)+xN(t)=1 .
In every time period dt there is a positive probability adt that a ﬁrm i,f o l -
lowing a certain strategy, will compare its proﬁts and consequently its strategy,
with the corresponding proﬁts and strategy of another randomly chosen ﬁrm j.25
25In motivating the replicator dynamics we follow Gindis (2000).
10If ﬁrm i perceives that the other’s proﬁts are higher, then it switches its strategy
to ﬁrms j’s strategy. There is imperfect information concerning the diﬀerence
in the expected proﬁts of the two strategies, since there is uncertainty in the
subjective probability law determining the probability of legislation, and possi-
ble uncertainty regarding the true cost functions under the voluntary agreement
or under regulation. In this context the higher the diﬀerence between proﬁts
is, the higher the probability is that ﬁrm i will perceive it and change strategy.
Particularly, ﬁrm i that did not participate in the public VA in time t,m i g h t
decide to switch strategy and ﬁnally sign the agreement if its expected prof-
its EΠN without participation, deﬁned by (6), are less than the corresponding
proﬁts Πv(ev) of the participating ﬁrm. Therefore, the probability that a non-
participating ﬁrm will change its strategy and ultimately sign the public VA,




β [Πv(ev) − pΠL(eL) − (1 − p)ΠN(eo)] for Πv(ev) > EΠN
0 for Πv(ev) ≤ EΠN
The expected proportion of ﬁrms that decides to participate in the voluntary
public VA in time t + dt is given as:




or alternatively if we use the deﬁnition of the average proﬁts:
Ext+dt = xt + αdtxtβ(Πv(ev) − ¯ Π(e))
where ¯ Π(e) is deﬁned as the average proﬁt for the whole population at time t:
¯ Π(e)=xΠv(ev)+(1−x)EΠN = xΠv(ev)+(1−x)[ΠN(eo) − p(ΠN(eo) − ΠL(eL))]
It has been assumed that the population of ﬁrms in the industrial sector is
large, thus we can replace Ext+dt by xt+dt. Moreover, if we subtract from both
sides the term xt,d i v i d eb ydt and ﬁnally take the limit as dt → 0,w ed e r i v e
an equation that describes the behavior of the fraction x over time. This is the
replicator dynamic equation:
˙ x = αβxt £
Πv(ev) − ¯ Π(e)
¤
Replicator dynamics indicates that the frequency of the signatory strategy
increases exactly when its proﬁts Πv(ev) are above the average proﬁts ¯ Π(e).I f
we substitute the proﬁtd e ﬁnitions and drop t, then the replicator dynamics
equation is rewritten as follows:
˙ x = αβx(1 − x)[p(ΠN(eo) − ΠL(eL)) − (ΠN(eo) − Πv(ev))] (14)
However, it has already been mentioned that participation in the agreement
does not imply that a ﬁrm will also comply with the agreement. We assume that
11in choosing between compliance or not, ﬁrms imitate successful strategies as in
the choice of the participation strategy deﬁned above by collecting (incomplete)
information regarding expected proﬁts of non-complying ﬁrms. Let z(t) denote
the proportion of ﬁrms complying with the agreement, while zN(t) denotes the
remaining proportion of non-complying ﬁrms at time t, with z(t)+zN(t)=1 .
After following the same conceptional framework as above, the replicator
dynamics equation for the compliance strategy is deﬁned as:
˙ z = γδzt £
Πv(ev) − ¯ ΠVN(e)
¤
where γ and δ correspond to α and β above, and ¯ ΠVN(e) is the average proﬁts
for the whole population of signatory ﬁrms deﬁned as:
¯ ΠVN(e)=zΠv(ev)+( 1− z)[qΠC(eL,F)+( 1− q)ΠN(eo)]
Then the speciﬁc form of the replicator dynamics equation for the complying
strategy is deﬁned as:
˙ z = γδz(1 − z)[q(ΠN(eo) − ΠC(eL,F)) − (ΠN(eo) − Πv(ev))] (15)
The evolution of the emission stock is aﬀected by the decisions to participate
in the agreement and further comply with its provisions and established goals.
Therefore the pollution stock dynamic equation (1) can be further speciﬁed as:
˙ S = n{x[zev +( 1− z)(qeL +( 1− q)eo)] + (1 − x)eo} − ϕ(S) (16)
4 Fast - Slow Selection Dynamics in the Evolu-
tion of Public Voluntary Agreements
The purpose of introducing diﬀerent time scales in the replicator dynamics
framework characterizing the evolution of voluntary agreements is to capture
the fact, observed in real situations, that when a VA of the type analyzed
here is oﬀered, the composition regarding participation is ﬁnalized relatively
fast. Since ﬁrms have to decide whether to accept the oﬀer within a relatively
small time interval determined by legislatory procedures, we expect evolution-
ary pressures to work relatively fast. On the other hand compliance behavior
is not constrained by a time framework so we expect evolutionary pressures to
operate more slowly relative to the participation case. This implies that the
rate of change of x with respect to time is “large” in absolute value, while the
rate of change of z is relatively slower. That is,
¯ ¯dx
dt
¯ ¯ ≡ |˙ x|À
¯ ¯dz
dt
¯ ¯ ≡ |˙ z|.
The above argument implies that in (14) and (15) we can set αβ =1and
γδ = ε where ε is a small positive parameter. Assuming that the natural system
evolves in a time scale which is comparable to the slow compliance variable, then
our dynamic system can be written in a fast time scale as:
12dx
dτ
= f1 (x,S) (17)
dz
dτ
= εf2 (z,S) (18)
dS
dτ
= εf3 (x,z,S) (19)
where fi,i=1 ,2,3 represent the right hand sides of (14), (15) and (16) respec-
tively. System (17)-(19) is the fast time system (FTS). If fast time is scaled
such that τ = t/ε, so that dτ = dt/ε then the replicator dynamics system char-
acterizing participation, compliance and pollution accumulation can be written
in slow time as:
ε˙ x = f1 (x,S) (20)
˙ z = f2 (z,S) (21)
˙ S = f3 (x,z,S) (22)
The problem deﬁned in the dynamical system (20)-(22 is a singular perturba-
tion problem.26 The general method for analyzing it, is to consider the systems
at the limit ε → 0. If the solutions satisfy certain regularity conditions for ε =0 ,
then solutions for small ε can be approximated by the solutions for ε =0 . By
taking ε =0in system (20)-(22) we obtain the reduced system
0=f1 (x,S) (23)
˙ z = f2 (z,S) (24)
˙ S = f3 (x,z,S) (25)
In the reduced system equation (23) provides, if it can be solved for x, the
equilibrium participation rate for ﬁxed level of S, as
x = h(S) (26)










The equilibria of the FTS are denoted by hj (S),j=1 ,...,J, where J is the
number of these equilibria. For the stable equilibria from the set of equilibria
26For the analysis of problems in a fast-slow time framework see, for example, Wasow (1965,
Chapter X) or Sastry (1999, Chapter 6).
13of (26), the slow variables evolve as:
˙ z = f2 (z,S) (27)
˙ S = f3 (h(S),z,S) (28)
The analysis of the dynamic system (27) and (28) can be used to determine
the long-run ES compliance and pollution stock (z∗,S∗). Then the long-run ES
participation in the VA will be determined as h(z∗,S∗).27
5 Long-Run Structures of a Public VA
The conceptual framework developed above is used to determined the long-run
structure regarding participation in and compliance with a public VA. Since
the long-run structure is determined as a stable equilibrium of the replicator
dynamics equation, it has the property of evolutionary stability.28 To illus-
trate the importance of the legislation and auditing probabilities in determining
these long-run structures, we classify the following analysis according to the
characteristics of these probabilities.
5.1 Pollution Stock Dependent Legislation Probability
Assume that the subjective probability of introducing legislation depends only
on the deviation from the targeted emission stock level, deﬁned as ∆S.T h e ni n
the fast time system the observed emission stock S and the deviation from the
target ∆S,a r eb o t hﬁxed and anticipated as parameters. As a consequence the
legislation probability is ﬁxed, implying that p = p(∆S). Under this deﬁnition
the slow time dynamic system (23)-(25) is deﬁned as:
0=x(1 − x)
£
p(∆S)(ΠN(eo) − ΠL(eL)) − (ΠN(eo) − Πv(ev))
¤
(29)
˙ z = z(1 − z)[q(ΠN(eo) − ΠC(eL,F)) − (ΠN(eo) − Πv(ev))] (30)
˙ S = n{x[zev +( 1− z)(qeL +( 1− q)eo)] + (1 − x)eo} − ϕ(S) (31)
The solution of the replicator dynamics equation (29) provides the long-
term equilibrium participation rates x∗,f o rﬁxed level of observed emission
stock S. Two steady states exist, x∗
1 =1and x∗
2 =0 , implying either full or
non-participation in the public VA.
The stability condition is obtained by taking the derivative of (29) with
respect to x, or:
27In more technical terminology the dynamic system (27) and (28) is deﬁned on the sta-




is stable in FTS
¾
.
Solutions of the slow system (20)-(22) at least locally are attracted to this manifold.
28Formally a strategy ˆ x is an evolutionary stable strategy if it is a strongly stable equilibrium
point of the replicator dynamics equation. Strong stability means that if ˆ x is contained in
a convex hull of the strategy simplex, all strategies in the neighborhood of ˆ x converge to ˆ x.
(See, for example, Hofbauer and Sigmund (2003).)
14d˙ x
dx
=( 1− 2x)Ω (32)
where Ω =[ p(∆S)(ΠN(eo) − ΠL(eL)) − (ΠN(eo) − Πv(ev))]. There is a critical
probability value, deﬁned as
a
p(∆S),t h a ts e t sΩ equal to zero and behaves as
a bifurcation parameter.29 It can easily be seen that the sign of the expression
Ω, and therefore the stability of the steady states, depend on the magnitude of
the ﬁxed legislative probability p(∆S) relative to the critical probability value
ˆ p(∆S). Speciﬁcally, if the regulator can announce and commit to a legislative
probability higher than the critical value, then Ω > 0. On the other hand, if
the probability p(∆S) is lower than the critical value, then Ω < 0.
Under this deﬁnition it follows that:
If p(∆S) > ˆ p(∆S) then d˙ x
dx |x∗
1=1< 0 and d˙ x
dx |x∗
2=0> 0
If p(∆S) < ˆ p(∆S) then d˙ x
dx |x∗
1=1> 0 and d˙ x
dx |x∗
2=0< 0
In the ﬁrst case, ﬁrms perceive that the implementation of the legislation
mandate is highly likely. Therefore ﬁrms prefer the proﬁtl o s sΠN(eo)−Πv(ev)
under the public VA, to the higher proﬁtl o s s e sΠN(eo)−ΠL(eL) which will be
realized if legislation is ﬁnally imposed. Consequently, all ﬁrms participate in
the public VA and x∗
1 =1is stable, while x∗
2 =0is unstable. Furthermore the
ambient pollution stock is equal to the industrial emission target Ev.I n t h e
second case, the legislation mandate appears less likely and ﬁrms can maintain
the unregulated proﬁts ΠN(eo). Therefore no ﬁrm has the incentive to partici-
pate in the public VA and receive reduced proﬁts by ΠN(eo)−Πv(ev) so x∗
2 =0
is stable.
These ﬁndings can be summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Under an emission stock dependent legislative probability the
fast time dynamic system converges to a monomorphic equilibrium. If p(∆S) ∈
(ˆ p(∆S),1], then there is full participation in the public VA and x∗
1 =1is the
ES equilibrium. If p(∆S) ∈ [0, ˆ p(∆S)), then there is non-participation in the
public VA and x∗
2 =0is the ES equilibrium.
Furthermore the total derivative of Ω =0deﬁnes the relationship between










It is obvious that the higher the eL is, the lower the critical probability
value ˆ p(∆S) is. Therefore the regulator can achieve full participation in the
29a




ΠN(eo)−ΠL(eL) < 1,s i n c eΠN(eo) − Πv(ev) < ΠN(eo) −
ΠL(eL).
30As noted above, a target eL can be attained either through emissions taxes, tradable
emission permits or emission limits. From our assumptions about the industrial model it
follows that Π
0
L (eL) < 0.
15environmental agreement by commitment to a given eL, instead of commitment
to a legislation probability.
At this point we assume for simplicity that the regulator has set p(∆S) >
ˆ p(∆S) and therefore the full participation steady state x∗
1 =1is ES in the fast
time.31 This steady state of the fast time dynamic system (29) is substituted
in the slow time dynamic system, from which the long-term compliance and
emission stock critical points are determined.
˙ z = z(1 − z)[q(ΠN(eo) − ΠC(eL,F)) − (ΠN(eo) − Πv(ev))] (34)
˙ S = n{zev +( 1− z)(qeL +( 1− q)eo)} − ϕ(S) (35)
The system has a hierachical structure, implying that the stable equilibria of
the replicator dynamics (34) can be determined ﬁrst and then used to determine
the pollution stock equilibria of equation (35). In order to more clearly deter-
mine the steady state pollution stock, (35) can be further speciﬁed by assuming
that the emissions outﬂows term is linear, implying that ϕ(S)=bS with b>0.




n{ev − [qeL +( 1− q)eo]}
−
{qeL +( 1− q)eo}
{ev − [qeL +( 1− q)eo]}
= AS − B,A<0 ,B< 0
However the auditing probability q can either be ﬁxed ¯ q or dependent on the
state variables of the problem, that is, the deviations from the desired pollution
stock ∆S and the share of non-complying ﬁrms. Therefore it is interesting to
examine how these alternative assumptions about the auditing probability aﬀect
the resulting equilibrium compliance and pollution stock.
5.1.1 Case 1: Fixed Auditing Probability
Assume that the regulator is committed to a ﬁxed auditing probability. Partic-
ipating ﬁrms know exactly the probability ¯ q under which they may experience
proﬁtl o s s e sΠN(eo) − Πc(eL,F), if caught violating the agreement’s provisions
by the regulator. Based on this knowledge they deﬁne their evolutionary strat-
egy of whether or not to comply with the agreement.
Under this assumption the slow time dynamic system (34) and (35) becomes:
˙ z = z(1 − z)[¯ q(ΠN(eo) − ΠC(eL,F)) − (ΠN(eo) − Πv(ev))] (36)
˙ S = n{zev +( 1− z)(¯ qeL +( 1− ¯ q)eo)} − bS (37)
In this case there are two steady-states, satisfying the equilibrium condition
˙ z =0 . The equilibrium outcome is always monomorphic, implying either full
31It makes no sense to examine the slow time dynamic system when x∗
2 =0 , since non-
participating ﬁrms are not expected to do "self-regulation".
16compliance z∗
1 =1or non-compliance z∗
2 =0with the agreement. These steady
states corresponds to two parallel isocline. The stability condition that deﬁnes
the prevailing evolutionary sustainable equilibrium is:
d˙ z
dz
=( 1− 2z)Φ (38)
where Φ =[ ¯ q(ΠN(eo) − ΠC(eL,F)) − (ΠN(eo) − Πv(ev))]. There is a critical
probability value
l
q that sets Φ =0 .I np a r t i c u l a r ,i f¯ q>
l
q then Φ > 0 and if
¯ q<
l
q then Φ < 0. Thus the stability conditions becomes:
If ¯ q>
l
q then d˙ x
dx |z∗





q then d˙ x
dx |z∗





q then full compliance is the ES outcome, while if ¯ q<
l
q then no
compliance is the ES strategy. The ˙ S =0isocine deﬁnes the corresponding
pollution stock equilibrium. Thus, if z∗
1 =1then S∗
1 = nev
b , which is a target
pollution stock level, while if z∗





The above conclusions can be summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Under a ﬁxed auditing probability the slow time dynamic system
converges to a monomorphic equilibrium. If ¯ q ∈ (
l
q,1) then there is full com-
pliance with the public VA and z∗







there is non-compliance in the public VA and z∗
2 =0is the ES equilibrium.
By taking the total derivative of Φ =0we obtain the relationship that
connects the critical auditing probability value
l
q and the non-compliance ﬁne











It is evident that the higher the non-compliance ﬁne is, the lower the critical
probability value
l
q is. This shoes that a lower number of random inspections
may induce participating ﬁrms to comply with the agreement when ﬁnes are
high. Therefore the regulator can achieve full compliance and the established
industrial environmental goal Ev with less monitoring eﬀort.
5.1.2 Case 2: Compliance Dependent Auditing Probability
Under the assumption that the auditing probability is dependent on the fraction
of complying participating ﬁrms, the slow time dynamic system (34) and (35)
becomes:
˙ z = z(1 − z)[q(z)(ΠN(eo) − ΠC(eL,F)) − (ΠN(eo) − Πv(ev))] (40)
˙ S = n{zev +( 1− z)(q(z)eL +( 1− q(z))eo)} − bS (41)
17It can easily be seen that the equilibria of compliance replicator dynamics
(40) are z∗
1 =1and z∗
2 =0 . Nevertheless, there could be an additional critical
point, deﬁned as z∗
3 : q(z∗
3)(ΠN −ΠC)−(ΠN −Πv),z∗
3 ∈ (0,1), that also satisﬁes
the equilibrium condition ˙ z =0 .
In this case the stability condition that determines the equilibrium type of
each steady state, is deﬁned as:
d˙ z
dz
=( 1− 2z)Φ + z(1 − z) q
0
(z)(ΠN(eo) − ΠC(eL,F)) (42)
where Φ =[ q(z)(ΠN(eo)−ΠC(eL,F))−(ΠN(eo)−Πv(ev))]. There is a critical
probability value ˆ q(z∗
3), which corresponds to the steady state z∗
3 and sets Φ
equal to zero. It is evident that if the initial compliance fraction z is lower
than the critical proportion z∗
3, then due to condition (10) the existing auditing
probability is higher than ˆ q(z∗
3) and Φ > 0. On the other hand, if z>z ∗
3 then
q(z) < ˆ q(z∗
3) and Φ < 0. The sign of the expression Φ aﬀects the stability of
the steady states and in particular, it can be seen that the slow time dynamic








2=0 = Φ > 0
Therefore it is clear that the ES equilibrium does not correspond to full
compliance or non-compliance with the public VA. If there is full compliance
then condition (10) holds and the regulator may respond to this with a reduced
or even zero number of random inspections. This gives participating ﬁrms a
ﬁnancial incentive to violate the agreement. On the other hand, in the case of
no compliance the value of q (0) is suﬃciently high, making the proﬁtl o s s e sa t
the level ΠN(eo)−ΠC(eL,F) highly likely. This gives non-participating ﬁrms a
ﬁnancial incentive to comply with the agreement’s provisions, since the ΠN(eo)−
Πv(ev)) proﬁt losses are preferable to the proﬁt losses under the legislation and
the non-compliance ﬁne. Thus, the slow time dynamic system converges to a
polymorphic stable equilibrium, implying that only a sub-group of participating









3)(ΠN(eo) − ΠC(eL,F) < 0
It is noticeable that the stability of the particular steady state z∗
3 is inde-
pendent of the existing auditing probability value. This implies that the initial
distribution of complying ﬁr m sd o e sn o ta ﬀect the equilibrium outcome and













Therefore, in this case the following proposition holds:
Proposition 3 Under a compliance dependent auditing probability, partial com-
pliance to the public VA is the ES outcome.
Finally, after taking the total derivative of Φ, the relationship between the







The higher the ﬁne for non-compliance is, the higher the ΠN(eo)−ΠC(eL,F)
proﬁt losses are for violators. Therefore under the threat of a higher ﬁne, par-
ticipating ﬁrms have a ﬁnancial incentive to comply with the regulator and
fulﬁll the individual environmental target ev. Consequently an increased non
compliance ﬁne, increases the equilibrium compliance proportion and shifts the
polymorphic steady state upwards, closer to the full compliance critical point.
It is evident that the higher the ﬁne is, the more participating ﬁrms comply with
the public VA. So under the appropriate adjustments of the ﬁne, compliance in
t h el e f ts i d en e i g h b o r h o o do fz∗
1 =1is an ES outcome.
5.1.3 Case 3: Emission Stock Dependent Auditing Probability
Assume that the auditing probability depends on the deviation from the estab-
lished environmental goal. It is important to mention that the observed emission
stock is no longer ﬁx e di nt h es l o wt i m e . I nt h i sc a s et h es l o wt i m ed y n a m i c
system is deﬁned as:
˙ z = z(1 − z)[q(∆S)(ΠN(eo) − ΠC(eL,F)) − (ΠN(eo) − Πv(ev))] (44)
˙ S = n{zev +( 1− z)(q(∆S)eL +( 1− q(∆S))eo)} − bS (45)
The compliance replicator dynamics equation (44) has two equilibria, deﬁned
as z∗
1 =1and z∗
2 =0 . Moreover, the equilibrium condition ˙ z =0is further
satisﬁed by a critical emission stock level
a
S, with corresponding probability
value ˆ q(∆S) which sets Ω =[ q(∆S)(ΠN(eo) − ΠC(eL,F)) − (ΠN(eo) − Πv(ev))]
equal to zero. From condition (9), it is evident that Φ > 0 if q(∆S) > ˆ q(∆S)
and Φ < 0 if q(∆S) < ˆ q(∆S). Thus the stability condition is:
d˙ z
dz
=( 1− 2z)Φ (46)
However, in slow time the deviation ∆S is no longer ﬁxed. It can be easily
seen that the type of the prevailing equilibrium depends on the existing rela-
tionship between the critical emission stock level ˆ S, the full compliance emission
stock level S∗
1 and/or the non-compliance stock level S∗
2.
Assume that the critical emission stock level ˆ S lies beneath both the full
compliance emission stock level S∗
1 and non-compliance stock level S∗
2.T h i s
implies that ˆ q(∆S) <q 1(∆S) <q 2(∆S) and thus Φ > 0. In this case (46)
implies that:











Thus, the ES equilibrium is monomorphic with full compliance z∗
1 =1 , and
equilibrium pollution stock S∗
1 = nev
b (See ﬁgure 1a).
19Assume that the critical emission level lies between the full and non-compliance
emission stock level. This implies that q1(∆S) < ˆ q(∆S) with Φ < 0 and
ˆ q(∆S) <q 2(∆S) with Φ > 0. In this case (46) implies that:
if S∗










Thus, the full compliance and non-compliance critical points are both unsta-
ble in the long run, implying that the ES equilibrium can not be monomorphic.
Nevertheless the slow time dynamic system has an additional steady state, de-
ﬁned as z∗
3, indicating a potential polymorphic equilibrium. To characterize
the equilibrium type of this steady state we deﬁne the Jacobian (linearization)
matrix J around this point:
J =
·
0 z(1 − z)q0(∆S)(ΠN(eo) − ΠC(eL,F))
n{ev − (q(∆S)eL +( 1− q(∆S))eo))} n(1 − z)q0(∆S)(eL − eo)
¸
For J the trace Tr(J) < 0 while the determinant Det(J) > 0 is positively
deﬁned, since we have d ˙ S
dz, d ˙ S
dS < 0 and d˙ z
dS > 0. However, the discriminant
∆ =[ Tr(J)]
2 − 4Det(J) can be positive, negative or even zero. Consequently
the equilibrium in the partial compliance critical point z∗
3 can be a stable focus,
a stable proper node or even a stable improper node. Qualitative analysis of
the phase diagram in Figure 1b suggests that z∗
3 is a stable focus.
Thefore in this case compliance and the pollution stock ﬂuctuate with the






Assume that the full compliance emission stock level S∗
1 and non-compliance
stock level S∗
2 lie beneath the critical emission level. This implies that ˆ q(∆S) >
q1(∆S) >q 2(∆S) and thus Φ < 0. In this case (46) implies that:











Thus, the ES equilibrium is monomorphic with no compliance z∗
2 =0and
equilibrium pollution stock S∗
2 =
n{q(∆S)eL+(1−q(∆S))eo}
b (See ﬁgure 1a).
[Figure 1]
We summarize in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Under an emission stock dependent auditing probability the slow
time dynamic system can converge to either a polymorphic or monomorphic
compliance equilibrium. If ˆ S<S ∗
1 <S ∗
2 then there is full compliance and
z∗
1 =1is the ES equilibrium. If S∗
1 > ˆ S>S ∗
2 then there is partial compliance
and z∗
3 ∈ (0,1) is the ES equilibrium with ﬂuctuation approach dynamics. If
ˆ S>S ∗
1 >S ∗
2 then there is no compliance and z∗








the critical emission stock level declines with the level of the ﬁne and the vertical
isocline moves closer to the full compliance emission stock level in ﬁgure 1b.
Moreover the polymorphic equilibrium point moves closer to the monomorphic
steady state point A, implying that with the proper design of the non-compliance
ﬁne the regulator can induce a larger share of participating ﬁrms to comply.
5.1.4 Case 4: Joint Dependence of Auditing Probability on Compli-
ance Level and Pollution Stock
Assume that the auditing probability depends jointly on the observed emission
stock level and the proportion of complying ﬁrms. Under this assumption the
slow time dynamic system (34) and (35) becomes:
˙ z = z(1 − z)[q(∆S,z)(ΠN(eo) − ΠC(eL,F)) − (ΠN(eo) − Πv(ev))] (48)
˙ S = n{zev +( 1− z)(q(∆S,z)eL +( 1− q(∆S,z))eo)} − bS (49)
As before the compliance replicator dynamics equation (44) has two equi-
libria, deﬁned as z∗
1 =1and z∗
2 =0 . There could exist however a third ˙ z =0
isocine deﬁned as:
z = l(S):Φ =[ q(∆S,z)(ΠN(eo) − ΠC(eL,F)) − (ΠN(eo) − Πv(ev))] = 0
The corresponding probabilities ˆ q(∆S,z) of the (z,S) combinations lying
along this isocine satisfy the equality Φ =0 . Therefore every other combination
outside the isocline switches the sign of the expression Φ. Particularly, each
combination located on the right of the isocline gives Φ > 0 since q(∆S,z) >
ˆ q(∆S,z), while combinations located on the left give Φ < 0 since q(∆S,z) <
ˆ q(∆S,z).
In this case the stability condition is deﬁned as:
d˙ z
dz
=( 1− 2z)Φ + z(1 − z) q
0
(∆S,z)(ΠN(eo) − ΠC(eL,F)) (50)
While the replicator dynamics equilibria z∗
1 =1and z∗
2 =0correspond to
two parallel isoclines respectively, the isocine of the additional critical point z∗
3







The partial derivatives reﬂect the ﬁrms’ beliefs about the variability of the
auditing probability’s value due to changes in the levels of the state variables.
For example, if polluting ﬁrms give high signiﬁcance to increases in the observed
emission stock level, then both the probability value and the relative partial
derivative are expected to be high and vice versa.
21Assume that the ﬁrms perceive that the auditing probability’s value is more
sensitive to compliance proportion changes, or alternatively that it is less sen-
sitive to emission stock changes. In this case the isocline is ﬂatter and cuts the
emission stock dynamic isocline at a critical point located on the right of the
full compliance steady state in ﬁgure 2b.
[Figure 2]
On the left of the isocline Φ < 0,g i v i n gd˙ z
dz > 0 for z∗
1 =1 , while on the
right of the isocline Φ > 0, giving d˙ z
dz > 0 for z∗
2 =0 . As a consequence neither
the full nor the non-compliance critical points are stable. In this case the ES






b and partial compliance z∗
3 ∈ (0,1).
Assume that participating ﬁrms perceive that the auditing probability’s
value is more sensitive to emission stock changes, or alternatively that it is
less sensitive to compliance proportion changes. In this case the isocline z(S) is
steeper and cuts the emission stock dynamic isocline at a critical point located
on the left of the full compliance steady state (ﬁgure 2a), which is an unfeasi-
ble area of combinations since it lies above the z∗
1 =1isocline. Consequently
this critical point C, is not feasible. It is evident that on the right of the z(S)
isocline the corresponding probability values are higher than the critical values
ˆ q(∆S,z), giving Φ < 0, thus full compliance or z∗
1 =1is the ES equilibrium.32
We summarize in following proposition:
Proposition 5 Under an auditing probability with joint dependence on com-
pliance levels and pollution stock, the slow time dynamic system can converge
either to a polymorphic or monomorphic equilibrium. The type of the prevail-
ing ES equilibrium depends mainly on the slope and position of the z = φ(S)
isocline. The ﬂatter the isocline is, the more likely it is that the ES equilibrium
implies partial compliance. The more steeper the isocline is the more lokely it
is that ES equilibrium implies full compliance.
Finally, the equilibrium outcome can be further aﬀected through the value
of the non-compliance ﬁne, since it determines the position of the isocline z(S).
It has already been mentioned that the higher the non-compliance ﬁne is, the
more participating ﬁrms tend to comply with the agreement and control their
emission production. Consequently the regulator can shift the isocline upwards,
bringing the polymorphic equilibrium point closer to the monomorphic steady
state, through the announcement of a suﬃciently higher ﬁne F. Therefore, it
is logical to expect that under the proper design the slow time dynamic system
can eventually converge to the full compliance critical point.
32It should be noted that if participating ﬁrms perceive that changes in the observed emis-
sion stock level can not aﬀect the auditing probability value, then the partial derivative
∂q(∆S,z)/∂S is zero. Thus the auditing probability depends only on the proportion of com-
plying ﬁrms and the isocline is parallel to the horizontal axis as in case 2. If participating
ﬁrms perceive that the auditing probability value is not aﬀected by changes in the compliance
fraction, then the partial derivative ∂q(∆S,z)/∂z is zero. The auditing probability depends
only on the observed emission stock and the isocline is vertical to the horizontal axis as in
case 3.
226 Joint Dependence of Legislation Probability
on Pollution Stock and Participation in the
Public VA
Assume that the subjective probability of introducing legislation depends jointly
on the deviation from the targeted emission stock level ∆S and the participation
proportion x.T h i si m p l i e st h a tp = p(∆S,x). Under this assumption the slow
time dynamic system (23)-(25) is deﬁned as:
0=x(1 − x)[p(∆S,x)(ΠN(eo) − ΠL(eL)) − (ΠN(eo) − Πv(ev))] (51)
˙ z = z(1 − z)[q(ΠN(eo) − ΠC(eL,F)) − (ΠN(eo) − Πv(ev))] (52)
˙ S = n{x(∆S)[zev +( 1− z)(qeL +( 1− q)eo)] + (1 − x(∆S))eo} − bS(53)
The fast time dynamic equation (51) has three equilibria: the two critical
points, x∗
1 =1and x∗
2 =0 , and the third critical point x∗
3(∆S) ∈ (0,1), which
sets Ω =[ p(∆S,x)(ΠN(eo)−ΠL(eL))−(ΠN(eo) − Πv(ev))] equal to zero, implies
partial participation and depends on the deviation ∆S. The stability condition
for these equilibria is:
d˙ x
dx
=( 1− 2x)Ω + x(1 − x)p
0
(∆S,x)(ΠN(eo) − ΠL(eL)) (54)
It can easily be seen that if the probability value is equal to the critical value
ˆ p(∆S,x) then Ω is set equal to zero. Therefore the magnitude of the legislative
probability p(∆S,x) compared to the critical probability value ˆ p(∆S,x) aﬀects
the sign of the Ω and the stability of the steady states. Obviously, if the leg-
islative probability is higher than the critical value, then Ω > 0. On the other
hand, if the probability p(∆S,x) is lower than the critical value, then Ω < 0.
Under this deﬁnition it follows that:
d˙ x
dx
















In this case the ES equilibrium indicates that there is partial participation
in the environmental public VA. This happens because, in the case of full par-
ticipation the condition p(∆S,1|∆S>0) = 0 holds, giving polluting ﬁrms a
ﬁnancial incentive not to participate in the agreement. On the other hand, in
the case of non-participation, we have p(∆S>0,0) = 1, thus proﬁt losses equal
to ΠN(eo)−ΠL(eL) are certain, thus giving polluting ﬁrms a ﬁnancial incentive
to participate in the agreement’s provisions since the ΠN(eo) − Πv(ev)) proﬁt
losses are preferable. Obviously, the particular fast time dynamic system con-
verges to a polymorphic stable equilibrium x∗
3, implying that only a sub-group
of individual polluting ﬁrms participate in the public VA in the long-run.
These ﬁndings can be summarized in the following proposition:
23Proposition 6 Under a legislative probability that depends jointly on partici-
pation proportion and pollution stock the fast time dynamic system converges to
a polymorphic equilibrium, implying partial participation x∗
3 to the public VA.
After taking the total derivative of Ω with respect to the participation frac-








Obviously, the higher the legislative emissions eL are, the higher the ΠN(eo)−
ΠL(eL) proﬁt losses are for polluting ﬁrms that decide not to participate. There-
fore under the threat of a higher tax rate τ or stricter emissions limit ¯ e,i n d i -
vidual ﬁrms have a ﬁnancial incentive to participate in the public VA and the
participation fraction increases. It can be seen that an increase in the legislative
emissions eL, shifts the polymorphic x∗
3 steady state upwards, closer to the full
participation critical point, x∗
1 =1 . Therefore through proper design of the
legislation mandate the regulator can induce the majority of polluting ﬁrms to
participate in the agreement.
To analyze compliance and evolution of the pollution stock we analyze the
slow time reduced system by substituting the stable critical point x∗
3(∆S) of the
fast time system. In this case the slow time dynamic system is deﬁned as:
˙ z = z(1 − z)[q(ΠN(eo) − ΠC(eL,F)) − (ΠN(eo) − Πv(ev))] (56)
˙ S = n{x∗
3(∆S)[zev +( 1− z)(qeL +( 1− q)eo)] + (1 − x∗
3(∆S))eo} − bS (57)
Under the assumption of a legislation probability jointly dependent on emis-
sion stock and participation proportion, the emissions stock dynamic isocline




3(∆S){ev − [qeL +( 1− q)eo]}
−
x∗
3(∆S){qeL +( 1− q)eo} +( 1− x∗
3(∆S))eo
x∗
3(∆S){ev − [qeL +( 1− q)eo]}
As previously the equilibrium solution (z∗,S∗) of the slow time dynamic
system is highly dependent on the structure of the auditing probability q,w h i c h
can either be ﬁxed ¯ q or dependent on the state variables of the problem. Based
on the same conceptual framework developed in the previous section we conclude
that:
Proposition 7 Under a participation dependent legislation probability and a
ﬁxed or state variables dependent auditing probability, the ES equilibrium implies
partial participation in the public VA and full, non or partial compliance of the
participating subgroup of ﬁrms.
24It should be noted that because of non-linearities the compliance - pollu-
tion system could be characterized by multiple equilibria and irreversibilities as
shown in ﬁgure 3b with the ﬁnal outcome crucially depending on initial condi-
tions.
[Figure 3]
7C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the long-run structure of a public VA
and to specify certain characteristics that a public VA should possess in order
to induce the majority of or even all polluting ﬁrms to participate in the VA
and comply with its provisions. In this context we examine the evolution of
participation in and compliance with the public VA, along with the evolution
of the industrial pollution stock. Individual polluting ﬁrms’ decisions about
whether or not to participate in the agreement and furthermore whether or not
to comply with it, were based on evolutionary processes of comparing expected
proﬁts associated with the diﬀerent decisions, and were modelled by replicator
dynamics operating in fast and slow time scales.
The main ﬁnding is that the structure of the legislation and auditing prob-
ability and the levels of legislative emissions and non-compliance ﬁnes are the
main factors characterizing the ES outcomes. If the legislation probability is
emission stock dependent, consequently ﬁxed in fast time, then the equilibrium
outcome is monomorphic implying either full or non-participation. Speciﬁcally,
if the regulator announces a legislative probability higher than the critical value
and commits to it, then all the ﬁrms participate in the agreement. On the other
hand, if the legislation probability depends jointly on emission stock and par-
ticipation proportion, the evolutionary sustainable equilibrium is polymorphic,
implying partial participation. In this case the regulator can lead the equilib-
rium outcome closer to or even achieve full participation through the proper
design of the legislation mandate and particularly through the magnitude of the
legislative emissions eL. By committing to a ﬁxed auditing probability, higher
than a certain critical value, the regulator can achieve full compliance of the par-
ticipating ﬁrms. The same outcome can be achieved under certain initial con-
ditions when the auditing probability depends on speciﬁcs t a t ev a r i a b l e s .T h e
slow time dynamic system can alternatively converge to a partial compliance
steady state, either monotonically or oscillating, and under certain conditions
the compliance-pollution stock system is characterized by multiple equilibria
and irreversibilties, which can be eliminated by commitment to speciﬁc audit-
ing probabilities and/or ﬁnes. Finally, it is evident that the more complex the
design of the public VA is, the less likely is the ﬁnal achievement of the desired
environmental target through full participation and compliance. Speciﬁcally,
the more complex the structure of the legislation probability is, the more de-
pendent the equilibrium outcome is on the initial conditions and the more likely
25it is that multiple equilibria and ireversibilities exist.33 In conclusion it seems
that commitment to legislation and auditing probabilities along with properly
chosen legislative emission levels and non compliance ﬁnes are the main factors
in order to induce the entire industrial sector to participate and comply with
the public VA. If these conditions are not fulﬁlled partial participation, partial
compliance and even ﬂuctuation in the pollution stock are possible equilibrium
outcomes of the public VA.
In this paper, although legislation and compliance probabilities have been
endogenized, their cost to the regulator has not been taken into account. An
interesting area of further research would be to include the cost of legislation
and the cost of auditing in order to derive optimal auditing along with optimal
thresholds for introducing legislation. In this context the replicator dynamics
equations will be dynamic constraints to the regulators’s optimization problem,
combining bounded rationality and optimization notions.
33Experience in Belgium and Denmark indicates that ﬁrms refused to accept the deﬁned
framework of VAs by pointing out its complexity and the reality that, with its application, it
will approach traditional regulation (Šauer et al., 2001).
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Figure 3: Equilibrium with participation dependent legislation probability and
state variables dependent auditing probability
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